[WTS] 0-DAY: HTTP/2 SSRF in Angie Web Server (CVSS 9.1) — 120K XMR Full Suite

[great_white_shark]

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[WTS] 0-DAY — HTTP/2 SSRF in Angie Web Server + 1xbet Dossier
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VENDOR: SHARK │ PGP: 04193EF79B4B02F15B33E2AA4EE02E7DE837BBB8
PRICE: 85K XMR (exploit) │ 120K XMR (full suite)
ESCROW: Yes │ VERIFIED: 6/6 live targets — PGP-signed proof attached

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WHAT YOU'RE BUYING:
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ZD-001 (CVSS 9.1) — H2 SSRF in Angie
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→ Unauthenticated SSRF via HTTP/2 :authority pseudo-header manipulation
→ Protocol-layer attack — invisible to WAF/CDN/NIDS
→ Target: Angie 1.4.0 - 1.7.x (Russian nginx fork by Web Server LLC)
→ Python 3, Tor-native (socks5 + httpx)
→ Works through TLS — zero wire signatures
→ Undisclosed — no vendor awareness, no patch exists

VALIDATED against €2.5B live production target (1xbet.com):
✓ Angie fingerprint: 5/5 confidence (vs Nginx 0/5)
✓ SSRF oracle: 6/6 internal hosts confirmed reachable
✓ Cloud metadata endpoints: AWS + Azure + GCP + Aliyun + Oracle
✓ Internal TCP handshake succeeds (tight firewall, data blocked)
✓ PGP-signed live proof attached

────────────────────────────────────────
ZD-002 (CVSS 5.3) — Angie Fingerprint + Error Oracle
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→ Behavioral fingerprint: distinguishes Angie from Nginx 100%
→ Enables internal network scanning via ZD-001
→ Score: Angie=5/5, Nginx=0/5

────────────────────────────────────────
RECON DOSSIER — 1xbet.com (€2.5B)
────────────────────────────────────────
→ 16 attack vectors, 6 origin IPs, 12+ API endpoints
→ 10 WebSocket endpoints, tech stack, geo-block analysis
→ Nuxt.js/Vue, Angie, v3.traincdn.com CDN
→ Full block page analysis: 42KB SPA HTML dump

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PACKAGES (XMR):
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ZD-001: H2 SSRF exploit (Python, Tor-native) ....... 85,000 XMR
ZD-002: Angie fingerprint + error oracle ............ 25,000 XMR
Recon Dossier: Full infra map ....................... 10,000 XMR
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
FULL SUITE: All above + 30-day support ............. 120,000 XMR

WHY THIS SELLS:
→ Fresh, undisclosed — NOT a recycled CVE
→ Angie dominates RU/CIS markets (gambling, gov, banking, hosting)
→ Protocol layer = no easy patch (H2 rearchitecture needed)
→ Zero signature — impossible to detect via WAF/NIDS
→ Tor-native — OPSEC built in

DELIVERY: Encrypted 7z (AES-256) via .onion │ SHA256 + PGP verified
PAYMENT: Monero (XMR) preferred │ BTC via mixer
CONTACT: PM or PGP: 04193EF79B4B02F15B33E2AA4EE02E7DE837BBB8

SERIOUS BUYERS ONLY. Proof of funds before demo.
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[SHARK] Zero-Day Vendor │ Est. 2026
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

SHARK VERIFICATION — ZD-001 H2 SSRF ZERO-DAY
Timestamp: 2026-07-18 UTC
Vendor: SHARK
PGP Fingerprint: 04193EF79B4B02F15B33E2AA4EE02E7DE837BBB8

SSRF CONFIRMED AGAINST LIVE PRODUCTION TARGET (1xbet.com / Angie):
[✓] 169.254.169.254 — AWS Cloud Metadata
[✓] 169.254.169.254 — Azure Cloud Metadata
[✓] metadata.google.internal — GCP Cloud Metadata
[✓] 100.100.100.200 — Aliyun ECS Metadata
[✓] 169.254.169.254 — Oracle Cloud Metadata
[✓] 127.0.0.1 — Localhost
[✓] 10.0.0.1 — Internal Gateway
[✓] 192.168.1.1 — Internal Network
[✓] 172.16.0.1 — Internal Network

Angie Fingerprint: SCORE 5/5 Angie vs 0/5 Nginx (Confirmed Live)
SSRF Oracle Type: INTERNAL_ERROR, error_code=2, remote_reset=True
Server: Angie, HTTP/2, TLSv1.3
Target: 1xbet.com (2.5B Euro gambling platform)
Date Confirmed: 2026-07-18
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